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DOUBLE JEOPARDY V. DOUBLE PUNISHMENT-
CONFUSION IN CALIFORNIA
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been said "the California law on double jeopardy is a
strange amalgam of constitutional and statutory provisions. It is
often unclear whether a particular decision is based on the California
Constitution or on a statute .. .."' Aside from the Constitutional
guarantees against double jeopardy,' there are no less than eight
separate California statutes in this field.' The principal statutes,
however, are Penal Code § 1023, prohibiting multiple prosecutions
and Penal Code § 654, largely prohibiting multiple punishment for
the same act or omission. This article explores the application and
misapplication, past and present, of the two principal statutes. This
topic is an important one because of the every day misapplication of
these statutes by the California criminal courts. The purpose of the
note is to clarify a confusing area of the 'California criminal practice.
II. THE MEANING OF " JEOPARDY"
Jeopardy is the danger of conviction and punishment a defendant
undergoes when he is put on trial before a competent court,' based
on an indictment sufficient in form and substance to sustain a con-
viction,' after the jury has been charged with his deliverance.6 A jury
has been charged when it has been sworn. Once jeopardy has at-
tached, the defendant cannot again be charged for the same offense
unless the factual situation giving rise to his discharge comes within
one of the recognized exceptions to this general rule.
The fundamental notion forming the basis of the doctrine was
stated in Green v. United States,7 where the United States Supreme
Court said:
I PAcKEE, Federal Constitutional Requirement in State Proceedings, California
Criminal Law Practice, 503, 528 (1964).
2 U. S. CONST. amend V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "[Nlor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb." California provides: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense." CAL. CONST. art. I § 13.
3 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 654, 687, 793, 794, 1023, 1101, 1188, and 1387.
4 People v. Zadro, 20 Cal. App. 2d 320, 323; 66 P.2d 1204, 1206 (1937).
5 People v. Ammerman, 118 Cal. 23, 50 Pac. 15 (1897). Notwithstanding the fact
that the indictment or information is invalid, either in form or substance, CAL.
PEN. CODE § 1022 provides that the defense of once in jeopardy is available to
the defendant if there has been a trial on the merits, and the defendant was
acquitted.
6 People v. Finch, 119 Cal. App. Supp. 2d 892, 895, 258 P.2d 1124, 1127 (1953).
In the case where the defendant has waived the jury trial and receives a court
trial, jeopardy attaches when the trial has been entered upon. Usually this means
that the evidence has been offered and received.
7 355 U.S. 184 (1957). For a historical view of the plea of double jeopardy, see
the dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter, id. at 198.
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The underlying idea, one that is deeply rooted in at least the
Anglo-Saxon system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its
resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated at-
tempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby sub-
jecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling
him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well
as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be
found guilty.8
In Green the court was construing the Fifth Amendment, a part of
the Federal Bill of Rights and not the California constitutional and
statutory requirements. The provision against double jeopardy in the
Federal Constitution was adopted and interpreted long before Cali-
fornia incorporated such a provision and the California legislature
adopted the interpretation and principles of the double jeopardy
provision of the Fifth Amendment.'
A balancing of conflicting interests is necessary between the prin-
ciples expressed in Green and the interest of the state and the public
in the prevention of crime and the punishment of criminals. Thus,
under certain circumstances, it will be held that jeopardy has not
attached after the jury has been charged with the defendant's deliv-
erance or after the trial has commenced without a jury. In Califor-
nia, by statute, the trial court judge may dismiss the jury and declare
a mistrial without jeopardy attaching where there -appears good
cause and necessity.10 Illness or incapacity of a juror,"1 or the failure
of the defendant to appear at the trial after it has commenced, viti-
ate the jeopardy which has attached at the beginning of the trial. 2 A
"hung" jury does not constitute jeopardy."3
Another aspect of jeopardy, which illustrates the balancing of the
conflicting personal and state interests, is the rule that jeopardy is a
personal defense, and being so, it can be waived by the defendant.
Mere silence, or failure to object at a second trial, has been held
however, not to be a waiver of this important personal privilege. 4
8 355 U.S. 184, at 187-88.
9 Gomez v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 640, 328 P.2d 976 (1958).
20 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1141.
1 People v. Hess, 107 Cal. App. 2d 407, 424, 237 P.2d 568, 578-79 (1951).
12 People v. Higgins, 59 Cal. 357 (1881).
Is At the expiration of the time which the trial court judge deems proper, if he is
satisfied that there is no reasonable probability of a verdict, he may discharge the
jury without jeopardy attaching. Paulson v. Superior Ct., 58 Cal. 2d 1, 8, 373
P.2d 641, 647, 22 Cal. Rtpr. 649, 655 (1962). See Annot., 150 A.L.R. 764
(1944). Also see CAL. PEN. CODE'§ 1140.
14 Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949); In re Moore, 29
Cal. App. 2d 56, 59, 84 P.2d 57, 58 (1938).
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III. PENAL CODE § 1023
Two major problems are raised by § 1023 .2 They are (1) to
determine what is the "identity of the offense" test and (2) what
constitutes a "necessarily included offense" under § 1023? These are
the tests for its application set down by the Code section, which in
essence provides that once a defendant has been placed in jeopardy
a bar is formed preventing a subsequent trial based on the same of-
fense charged in the first trial or based on a charge which is neces-
sarily included in the offense that was charged at the first trial. In
applying these tests, the practicing attorney must remember that the
double jeopardy provisions of § 1023 are only available where jeop-
ardy has attached in a previous trial, and has no application to a
trial in the first instance where the same crime is charged under dif-
ferent Penal Code sections by a multi-count indictment."0
A. The "Identity of the Offense" Test
Penal Code § 1023 prohibits a second prosecution for the same
offense charged in the first accusatory pleadings, if the first trial re-
sulted in an acquittal, conviction, or the attachment of jeopardy. In
determining what is the "same offense charged" the courts have de-
veloped the "identity of the offense" test. They have made it clear
that in considering this plea they will look only to the accusatory
pleadings to determine what the offense was, and not to the acts or
omissions of the defendant that were the basis of the charge. This is
so even though the acts and omissions of the defendant could have
been the basis for charging the defendant with a violation of an-
other penal section.17 Even if the same evidence is used in the second
trial as was used in the first trial, § 1023 is not available to the
defendant, for the same evidence may support a conviction for more
than one violation under the Penal Code."8
Since it would be rare for the defendant to be charged in a second
trial for a violation of the same penal section, unless his acts or
omissions were against multiple victims " or for some reason enu-
merated under section II of this article jeopardy did not attach in the
first proceeding, it appears that the "identity of the offense" test is
of little help to the practicing attorney preparing a jeopardy defense.
15 CAL. PE'. CODE § 1023 provides: "When the defendant is convicted or acquitted
or has been once put in jeopardy upon an accusatory pleading, the conviction,
acquittal, or jeopardy is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense charged
in such accusatory pleading, or for an attempt to commit the same, or for an
offense necessarily included therein, of which he might have been convicted under
that accusatory pleading."
26 People v. Tideman, 57 Cal. 2d 574, 370 P.2d 1007, 21 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1962).
17 People v. Majors, 65 Cal. 138, 3 Pac. 597 (1884).
18 People v. Mehra, 73 Cal. App. 162, 181, 238 Pac. 802, 809 (1925).
'9 People v. DeCasaus, 150 Cal. App. 2d 274, 309 P.2d 835 (1957).
[VoL 2
NOTES
B. The "Included Offense" Test
The provision of § 1023 which is most likely to aid the attorney
in preparing a jeopardy defense lies in the prohibition against charg-
ing an offense in a second trial which was "necessarily included" in
an offense charged at a prior trial. Since the identical offense is
seldom charged, it appears that § 1023 is pragmatically only an aid
for "necessarily included offenses." As to what is a "necessarily in-
cluded offense," a constant judicial expansion, by the Supreme Court
of California, has taken place.
In People v. Krupa," the court in construing § 1023 specifically
stated what constituted a "necessarily included offense."
It is dear that where an offense cannot be accomplished without
necessarily committing another offense, the latter is a necessarily
included offense. If, in the commission of acts denounced by one
statute, the offender must always violate another, the one offense is
necessarily included in the other.2 ' (Emphasis added.)
Thus a prosecution for battery could not be followed by a prose-
cution for an assault based upon the same acts. An assault would be
a necessary element of the battery, it being impossible to commit a
battery on a victim without committing an assault. This test has also
been held to apply where there is a possibility of conviction for a
greater offense, i.e., first or second degree murder. When the jury
finds the defendant guilty of the lesser offense there is an implied
acquittal of the greater and the defendant can no longer be prose-
cuted for it in another trial.22 Also, if the defendant is charged with
a lesser offense and convicted, he cannot then be tried for a greater
offense involving the same acts, because the conviction in the first
trial negates a finding on the greater charge. 3 Therefore, under §
1023, the greater and lesser offenses arising out of the same acts or
omissions are necessarily included in each other.
People v. Greer"' is a graphic illustration of this test. The de-
fendant was convicted of lewd and lascivious conduct and statutory
rape. It was argued that the conviction in a previous trial on the
charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor included the
20 64 Cal. App. 2d 592, 149 P.2d 416 (1944).
21 Id. at 598.
22 ROMASANTA, A New Approach to Double jeopardy, lo HASTINGs LJ. 188
(1958).
23 People v. Ny Sam Chung, 94 Cal. 304, 28 Pac. 642 (1892). During the trial the
judge dismissed the information against the defendant charging him with petty
larceny, and the defendant was subsequently convicted of grand larceny. It was
held that Penal Code § 1023 precluded the prosecution for the grand larceny be-
cause the defendant had already been in jeopardy for a lesser offense. Note, de-
fendant could not have availed himself of Penal Code § 654 because in the first
trial there had not been an acquittal, or a conviction, and sentence.
24 30 Cal. 2d 589, 184 P.2d 512 (1947).
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offenses of statutory rape and lewd and lascivious conduct, and that
under § 1023 this subsequent conviction was barred. The court
upheld this argument, holding that every violation of Penal Code §
261 (1) (defining statutory rape) is also a violation of Penal Code
§ 702, (defining the offense of contributing to the delinquency of a
minor) because statutory rape under § 261 (1) includes always and
necessarily contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Although one
could contribute to the deliquency of a minor without committing
statutory rape, one could not commit statutory rape without con-
tributing to the delinquency of a minor.
The case of People v. Whitlow"5 is based on facts similar to Greer
but with a different result. Here the defendant was charged with
forcible rape under Penal Code § 261 (3) and was found guilty by
the jury of contributing to the delinquency of a minor under § 702.
He appealed, contending that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction
in entering the judgment of conviction, because contributing to the
delinquency of a minor was not necessarily included in the crime of
rape and was not charged in the indictment. The court upheld his
argument on the facts, but distinguished the Greer case. In W/hitlow
the defendant was charged generally with rape, and since this could
be committed against an adult, it would not always and necessarily
include the offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.
The application of § 1023 was considerably broadened by People
v. Marshall,26 which looked to the facts alleged in the indictment to
determine what was a "necessarily included offense." In Marshall,
defendant pleaded not guilty to a charge in the information worded
in the following manner:
Robbery, in violation of Penal Code 211, committed as fol-
lows: That the [defendantj . . . did wilfully, unlawfully, feloni-
ously, and forcibly take from the person and immediate presence of
Jack J. Martin... Seventy Dollars... and an automobile ....
Defendant was found guilty of car theft, under Vehicle Code § 503
(now § 10851). He appealed, contending that car theft was not
necessarily included in the offense of robbery, and that therefore his
conviction was not supported by the indictment charging him with
robbery. He based his appeal on Whitlow, which appeared to have
limited the test of what constituted a "necessarily included offense"
to the statutory definition of the offense charged in the accusatory
pleadings. The Supreme Court of California agreed with this hold-
ing but observed that the statutory definition of the crime charged
25 113 Cal. App. 2d 804, 249 P.2d 35 (1952).
26 48 Cal. 2d 394, 309 P.2d 456 (1957).
27 Id. at 396, 309 P.2d at 457.
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in the accusatory pleading was not the exclusive test of what consti-
tuted an "included offense." The ultimate criterion for such a deter-
mination was whether such a crime could be sustained from the facts
alleged in the accusatory pleading. In Marshall, although the statu-
tory definition of robbery did not necessarily include the offense of
car theft, there were sufficient facts in the accusatory pleading to
inform the defendant that he would have to defend against that
charge. Thus, although the offense was not specifically mentioned
by the statutory language, the offense was necessarily included be-
cause of the language of the accusatory pleading, and the conviction
was sustained.
Due to Marshall, there is now a double test of what constitutes a
"necessarily included offense" under § 1023. First, under the theory
of the Krupa case the court will have to consider whether the offense
in question could ever be committed without committing another
offense. If it could, then there is no "necessarily included offense"
as understood prior to Marshall. Second, the court will have to con-
sider that even if the offense charged could be committed without
committing another offense, it may be that the facts alleged in the
accusatory pleadings could have sustained a conviction in the first
trial. If this is so, then the offense charged in the second trial was
"necessarily included" in the one charged in the first trial and § 1023
bars another prosecution.
As a result of Marshall, consideration must be given to the accu-
satory pleadings. California's liberal rule for drafting accusatory
pleadings 8 is based on the underlying philosophy that their purpose
is to inform defendant of the charge, or charges, he will face at the
trial and is not an exercise in precise draftsmanship. In formulating
an indictment, complaint or information the District Attorney may
draft it in the statutory language defining the offense charged, or in
any simple, concise, and readily understandable language so long as
it informs the defendant of the nature of the charges. 9 Because of
this liberality the form of the pleading may, or may not, broaden the
scope of the "necessarily included offense" under § 1023. By draft-
ing the pleading according to the exact statutory language, the
28 CAL. PEN. CODE § 952 provides: "In charging an offense, each count shall con-
tain, and shall be sufficient if it contains, in substance, a statement that the ac-
cused has committed some public offense therein specified. Such statement may be
in ordinary and concise language without any technical averments or any allega-
tions of matter not essential to be proved. It may be in words of the enactment
describing the offense or declaring the matter to be a public offense, or in any
words sufficient to give the accused notice of the offense of which he is accused.
In charging theft it shall be sufficient to allege that the defendant unlawfully
took the labor or property of another." "
29 People v. Lamb, 204 Cal. App. 2d 255, 22 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1962).
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prosecutor may limit the application of § 1023 to only "necessarily
included offenses" as understood prior to Marshall. However, by
drafting the accusatory pleading in "simple, concise, and under-
standable language," the facts alleged in the pleading will deter-
mine whether or not there is a "necessarily included offense." For
example, suppose the defendant was charged by an information in
the following language: "Theft, in that the defendant John Doe
took by means of force against the person, property belonging to
one Jane Doe."
Under the wording of this information a jury could properly find
the defendant guilty of at least the crime of second degree robbery,
assault or battery. Thus, in this instance the drafting of the pleading
increases the possible number of crimes for which defendant might
be convicted in the first trial. On the other hand, assuming that
under the same information, the defendant was acquitted of the
crime of robbery, § 1023 would apply to bar a subsequent prosecu-
tion for assault or battery since under the rule laid down by Mar-
shall, the crimes of assault and/or battery were necessarily included
in the facts alleged in the indictment. Thus the diligent prosecutor
has an initial consideration when he is preparing the indictment. (1)
Should he take the "shotgun" approach, giving the jury the oppor-
tunity to convict on any possible crimes which defendant committed
under the facts by alleging facts generally in the indictment or (2)
should he take a more limited approach and charge only the crime
under the exact statutory language, thus limiting § 1023 to the old
"necessarily included offense" test of Krupa and saving other
charges for a possibly more favorably inclined jury.
The expansion of § 1023 by the Marshall case raises an additional
difficulty. A larger burden has been placed on the trial court judge
when giving instructions to the jury. The general rule was stated in
People v. Burns:
It is elementary that the court should instruct the jury upon every
material question upon which there is any evidence deserving of
consideration whatever ... The fact that the evidence may not be
of a character to inspire belief does not authorize the refusal of an
instruction based thereon .... That is a question within the exclu-
sive province of the jury. However incredible the testimony of the
defendant may be he is entitled to an instruction based upon the
hypothesis that it is entirely true.30
It has been held that the trial court judge has this duty to the
defendant whether or not he has been requested to give the instruc-
30 88 Cal. App. 2d 867, 871, 200 P.2d 134, 136 (1948). Also see People v. Jeeter,
60 Cal. 2d 690, 388 P.2d 355, 36 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1964).
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tions." The courts have applied this general rule to the cases in-
volving included offenses. If the trial court refuses to give requested
instructions as to an included offense, and there has been some
evidence to sustain this request, it is reversible error not to give the
instructions.3" This is so, even if there is substantial evidence to sus-
tain the conviction as to the greater offense charged.3 The only ex-
ception to this rule is where the evidence shows that if the defendant
is guilty at all, he is guilty of the greater offense. In this case, if the
trial court gives an instruction in regard to an included offense, it is
reversible error. 4
Since it is the duty of the trial court judge to instruct as to a
"necessarily included offense," a proper instruction would have to in-
dude not only those offenses that have been specifically proved at
the trial, but also an instruction as to any offense that could be
honed from the facts alleged in the accusatory pleading and inci-
dentally shown at the trial. Failure to so instruct would be reversible
error.
IV. PENAL CODE § 65435
DOUBLE PUNISHMENT AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY
California Penal Code § 654 has two important and distinct pro-
visions. The first prohibits punishment for the same act or omission
made punishable by different sections of the Penal Code, and the
other provides that jeopardy will attach after an acquittal, or con-
viction and sentence for an act made chargeable by more than one
section of the Penal Code.
A. Double Punishment Under Penal Code § 654
The scope of the proscription of § 654 against multiple punish-
ment depends largely on the meaning given to the phrase "act or
omission." Does this mean a single act or can it mean a series of
acts prompted by one overriding intent? In construing the phrase,
earlier cases alighted on the "necessarily included offense" test of
31 People v. Chavez, 37 Cal. 2d 656, 234 P.2d 632 (1951).
32 People v. Yancy, 171 Cal. App. 2d 371, 340 P.2d 328 (1959).
33 Ibid.
34 People v. Huntington, 138 Cal. 261, 70 Pac. 284 (1903). The defendant was
charged with murder. The prosecutor offered evidence of an illegal abortion which
was denied by defendant. The only crime for which defendant could properly be
convicted was murder and a manslaughter instruction is unnecessary and improper.
35 CAL. PEN. CODE § 654 provides: "Acts Made Punishable by Different Provisions
of this Code. An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by
different provisions of this Code may be punished under either of such provisions,
but in no case can it be punished under more than one; an acquittal or conviction
and sentence under either one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission
under any other. In the cases specified in Sections §§ 648, 667, and 668, the
punishment therein prescribed must be substituted for those prescribed for the
first offense, if the previous convictions is charged in the indictment and found by
the jury."
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Penal Code § 1023. If the crime was necessarily included in the
greater offense charged, the courts held there could be no multiple
punishment. 6
In People v. Kehoe,3" the California Supreme Court recognized
§ 654 could still apply where the crime was not necessarily included
in another:
But although a given crime is not necessarily included within an-
other one for the purposes of the double jeopardy statute, under
certain circumstances conviction of both crimes cannot be justified.
* . . The Penal Code recognizes this principle in Penal Code 654.
... This section is not concerned with the question of whether the
particular crime, in the abstract, necessarily and always is included
within another one, but rather, it is directed to the question of
whether two statutes punish one act of the defendant.
One year later, in People v. Knowles,8 the defendant was charged
with two counts of kidnapping for the purpose of robbery under
Penal Code § 209, and with one count of armed robbery. He was
convicted on all three counts. On appeal, the California Supreme
Court reversed the conviction of armed robbery, stating that the acts
of kidnapping could not be separated from the act of armed rob-
bery, and that § 654 required that the defendant be punished only
once.
If only a single act is charged as the basis of the multiple convic-
tions, only one conviction can be affirmed, notwithstanding that the
offenses are not necessarily included offenses. It is the singleness of
the act and not the offense that is determinative.3
9
The leading case construing the legislative intent relative to the
phrase "acts or omissions" is Neal v, State of California." Here the
defendant attempted to kill his victims by soaking the bed in which
they were sleeping with gasoline and igniting it. Neither of his vic-
tims died but both were severely burned. The defendant was charged
with two counts of attempted murder and with one count of arson.
The California Supreme Court reversed the conviction of arson
holding that the conviction violated Penal Code § 654. In construing
the phrase "act or omission," the court postulated what later became
known as the "indivisible transaction" test of § 654. Little weight
was placed on the acts of defendant. The point of emphasis became
defendant's intent and dominant purpose.
36 MADDUX, Applying Section 654 of the Penal Code, 32 So. CAL. L. REV. 50, 63
(1958).
3 33 Cal. 2d 711, 713, 204 P.2d 321, 322, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 834 (1949).
38 35 Cal. 2d 175, 217 P.2d 1; cert. denied, 340 U.S. 879 (1950).
89 Id. at 187, 217 P.2d at 8.
40 55 Cal. 2d 11, 357 P.2d 839, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607 (1960).
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Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible, and therefore
gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of Penal Code
654, . . .depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If all
the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be
punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.4'
The conviction of the crime of arson was reversed because it was
incidental to the dominant purpose of the actor, i.e., killing his vic-
tims. Under this test, the application of § 654 is no longer limited
to where the crime is a necessarily included offense."
The applicable scope of the double punishment provision of § 654
may best be explained by examples of the three possible acts to
which it could apply. They are: (1) The situation where the de-
fendant does one act against a single person; (2) the situation
where the defendant commits a series of criminal offenses with one
dominant purpose against a single victim; and (3) the situation
where the defendant does any of the acts described in (1) or (2)
against multiple victims.
Under the first category, where the defendant by a single act com-
mits a criminal offense against a single victim, he may be charged
and convicted under any or all applicable Penal Code sections. But
Penal Code § 654 prohibits punishment for more than one of the
offenses."
Under the second category, where defendant does a series of
criminal acts against a single victim, the Neal case is directly appli-
cable, even though in Neal there were multiple victims. The court
in Neal was not concerned with the punishment of the defendant
on the charge of murder, but was concerned with the sentencing for
arson. If all the acts which are criminal offenses are done under one
dominant intent of the defendant, within the meaning of § 654,
then the defendant can be punished under any one of them, but not
under more than one. Thus in People v. Niles, 4 defendant was
4' Id. at 19, 357 P.2d at 843-44, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 611-12.
42 Justice Schauer dissented in the Neal case. He felt that the opinion of the major-
ity hinged on a factual situation which is properly determined at the trial court
level. Further, he felt that the Neal test would open the doors to habeus corpus
proceedings. He states: "'Are the courts now to re-examine the cases of prisoners
now serving final sentences of imprisonment for both murder and related robbery
and to determine whether a defendant set out to rob and incidentally killed or set
out to kill and incidentally robbed (in either of which events, under the majority
holding, he could be sentenced at most for murder) or whether perchance he set
out to commit both robbery and murder and executed both of his intents as part
of the transaction by divisible acts?" 55 Cal. 2d at 25, 357 P.2d at 847, 9 Cal.
Rptr. at 615.
43 KAHN, Double Jeopardy, Multiple Prosecutions, and Multiple Punishment; A
Comparative Analysis. 50 CAL. L. Rav. 853, 857 (1962); People v. Kynette, 15
Cal. 2d 731, 762, 104 P.2d 794, 810 (1940).
44 227 Adv. Cal. App. 818; 39 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1964).
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charged and convicted of assault with force under Penal Code § 245
and with burglary under Penal Code § 459. The trial court sentenced
him on both counts. On appeal the court found that the offenses
charged were part of an "indivisible transaction," and that the domi-
nant intent of the defendant was burglary. Therefore, the defendant
could be convicted of both of the offenses, but § 654 prohibited
punishment on more than one of them.
Under the third category, where the defendant commits a single
act or a series of criminal acts dominated by one intent against mul-
tiple victims, the rule is well settled in California that Penal Code
§ 654 will not apply. " The leading case in this category is People v.
Brannon," wherein the defendant attempted to shoot and kill his
wife, but the bullet missed her and killed an innocent bystander.
Defendant was tried for assault with intent to commit murder and
was acquitted. He was then tried for the murder of the innocent
bystander. The trial court refused his plea of former jeopardy. The
District Court of Appeals upheld this ruling, stating that § 654 is
not applicable where one act has two results, each of which is an
act of violence against separate individuals. Justice Traynor justified
the rule as follows:
The purpose of the protection against multiple punishment is to in-
sure that the defendant's punishment will be commensurate with
his criminal liability. A defendant who commits an act of violence
with the intent to harm more than one person or by means likely
to cause harm to several persons is more culpable than a defendant
who harms only one person.47
B. Concurrent Sentencing Under Penal Code § 654
Concurrent sentencing poses an additional problem under the
multiple punishment provision of § 654. Following Neal, two par-
ticular aspects of this problem arose: (1) What was the proper
appellate court procedure in reversing improper sentencing under §
654, and (2) how could the trial courts avoid the ban of § 654 and
allow a double conviction for a "single" act and sentence on each
count so that if one conviction was reversed on appeal the other
conviction and sentence would stand.
Under the first aspect where the sentences were ordered to run
consecutively the appellate courts experienced no great difficulty.
45 Neal v. California, 55 Cal. 2d 11, 357 P.2d 839, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607 (1960).
46 70 Cal. App. 225, 233 Pac. 88 (1924).
47 Neal v. California, 55 Cal. 2d at 11, 357 P.2d at 844, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 612. It is
now the California law that a defendant cannot be punished for conspiracy and
for the substantive offense that was the subject of the conspiracy. The case of
People v. Keller, 212 Cal. App. 2d 210, 27 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1963) overruled a




They reversed and ordered the sentences to run concurrently, thus
avoiding the proscription of § 654.48 But under Neal, the appellate
courts were required to act in such a fashion as to exclude from
consideration of the Adult Authority the sentence of the "necessarily
included offense." Therefore the problem was that concurrent sen-
tences might prejudice the defendant when the Adult Authority
made its final determination of the minimum length of defendant's
sentence."' So the appellate court cases, following Neal, reversed the
judgment of conviction of the lesser of the two crimes, on the
grounds that the imposition of the sentence on the lesser of the two
crimes was in excess of the courts' jurisdiction."
Then in 1962 the case of People v. McFarland51 set down the
proper appellate under these circumstances:
The appropriate procedure, therefore, is to eliminate the effect of
the judgment as to the lesser offense insofar as the penalty alone is
concerned. It is true that there are cases which have, without quali-
fication, reversed the judgment of conviction as to the lesser count
thus apparently eliminating the effect of the judgment with respect
to conviction as well as punishment. (Emphasis added.)52
What now appears to be the proper appellate procedure is to reverse
the concurrent sentencing for an "act" arising out of an "indivisible
transaction" and only allow the lengthier sentence to stand. There
is no reversal of the convictions. This has been the procedure taken
by the cases since McFarland.5"
The second aspect has evidently been solved by People v. Niles."
Neal and McFarland had set down no appropriate procedure for the
trial court to adopt when sentencing a defendant for offenses that
may be within the "indivisible transaction" under § 654. In Niles
there was a conviction of assault and burglary which was part of an
"indivisible transaction." The trial court sentenced the defendant on
both the assault and burglary charges but stayed execution on the
48 People v. Kynette, 15 Cal. 2d at 762, 104 P.2d at 810.
49 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1168; People v. Younders, 96 Cal. App. 2d 562, 215 P.2d
743 (1950).
50 People v. Logan, 41 Cal. 2d 279, 260 P.2d 20 (1953); People v. Brown, 49 Cal.
2d 577, 320 P.2d 5 (1958).
51 58 Cal. 2d 748, 376 P.2d 499, 26 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1962).
52 Id. at 763, 376 P.2d at 457, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 481. The usual method for applying
the proscription of § 654 against double punishment was to vacate the conviction
on the lesser offense. People v. Logan, 41 Cal. 2d 279, 260 P.2d 20 (1953). A
few cases, however, allowed both convictions to stand, but gave effect to § 654 by
giving concurrent sentences. People v. Sigel, 55 Cal. App. 2d 279, 130 P.2d 763
(1942). People v. Brown, 49 Cal. 2d 577, 320 P.2d 5 (1958), suggested that
the imposition of concurrent sentences may have a prejudicial effect on the defend-
ant in the determination by the Adult Authority as to what length of time, if any,
the defendant is to be imprisoned. See Cal. Pen. Code § 1168.
53 People v. Jones, 211 Cal. App. 2d 63, 27 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1963).
54 227 Adv. Cal. App. 818, 39 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1964).
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sentence of assault pending appeal and during such time as the
Adult Authority was to pronounce on the minimum sentence for the
burglary, and at the completion of the sentence on the burglary, the
stay was to become permanent. The court stated:
[I]f ... [the trial court] dismisses the count carrying the lesser
penalty, and the conviction on the remaining count should be re-
versed on appeal, the defendant would stand no conviction at all.
Nor can the trial court safely sentence on one count only, since it
would lose jurisdiction after 21 days to sentence on the second
count (Penal Code § 1191)-long before any possible disposition
of an appeal.... [I]t follows that the procedure adoptedby the
trial court in this case was a reasonable-and so far as we can see-
the only possible reconciliation of the various policies involved.
Any other method either incurs the chance of letting a defendant
escape altogether, or else imposes an unnecessary burden on an ap-
pellate court on the inevitable remand for correction of sentence. "
The case of People v. Quinn", appears to the latest word on the
application of § 654 to concurrent sentencing. In this case the de-
fendant was charged with theft of narcotics, theft of money, and
robbery. These acts were all against the same victim and all part of
his dominant intent to obtain narcotics. The California Supreme
Court stated, "Section 654 of the Penal Code proscribes double pun-
ishment of a criminal act that constitutes more than one crime, and
concurrent sentences are double punishment. (Emphasis added) "
This appears to be as yet the broadest construction of § 654, but on
examination of the facts it would appear that concurrent sentencing
is only double punishment within § 654 if the acts and omissions
that are punished are part of an "indivisible transaction." Further,
it must be remembered that § 654 can be applied only when the
indivisible transaction test is met. In Quinn the court had specifically
found that the defendant's primary intent was to obtain narcotics
and that the other offenses were just a means to carry out the crime.
One leading case which recognizes the distinction between § 654
and the multiple punishment provision of Penal Code § 1023 is
People v. Tideman. 8 The defendant was charged with illegal abor-
tion and murder. Each offense was alleged to have been committed
on the same victim at the same time. The defendant pleaded guilty
to the charge of illegal abortion, and immediately raised the defense
of double jeopardy. "9 Later the defendant was convicted of murder
55 Id. at 822, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
56 61 Adv. Cal. 608, 393 P.2d 705, 39 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1964).
57 Ibid. at 612, 393 P.2d at 708, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
58 57 Cal. 2d 574, 370 P.2d 1007, 21 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1962).
59 In People v. Mines, 136 Cal. App. 2d 828, 289 P.2d 539 (1955), the court al-
lowed the defendant to plead guilty of petty theft. Later, the judge set aside the
plea, and the defendant was found guilty of grand larceny. On appeal, the deci-
sion was reversed under § 1023.
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and when he came before the court for sentencing, the judge ordered
that the guilty plea on the abortion charge be set aside and dis-
missed, and sentenced the defendant on the murder count. Although
the defendant had specifically based his appeal on Penal Code §
1023, the court found that the situation was precisely within Penal
Code § 654. The court noted:
They have different origins. Each rests on a different base, has a
different objective and performs, a different function. If confusion
is to be avoided, it is important that the two are not intermingled.60
Since § 654 does not preclude multiple counts arising out of the
same criminal act being charged and tried in the same trial, but only
prohibits the imposition of punishment on more than one count
when they are part of an "indivisible transaction," the trial court
judge did not err in the Tideman case. He had not pronounced sen-
tence on the plea of guilty to the illegal abortion, so there was no
punishment within the meaning of § 654.
C. Double Jeopardy Under Penal Code § 654
The double jeopardy provision of § 654 includes the phrase "act
or omission," as does the multiple punishment provision of the same
section. As we have seen under the multiple punishment provision,
the phrase has been the subject of expansion. This same expansion
of the phrase applied to the multiple prosecution provision.
The landmark case which dearly explains the use and the restric-
tions of the double jeopardy provision of § 654 is Tideman, in
which the court noted:
The next clause of section 654 [Ain acquittal for conviction and
sentence under either . . . [of the violated provisions] has no ap-
plication to the facts of this case. It has no application here for at
least two reasons, each of which is independently compelling: (1)
As has been shown, there has been but one prosecution; i.e., a
single criminal action. (2) The trial judge wisely did not pro-
nounce sentence on the plea of guilty to Count I [to the abor-
tion]. Until sentence was pronounced for murder as charged in
Count II there had been neither an acquittal of either charge nor a"conviction and sentence" under either; and, manifestly, no punish-
ment for either.61
Section 654 of the Penal Code, in its provisions against subse-
quent prosecutions, affords the defendant protection beyond and dif-
ferent than that afforded by Section 1023. While §1023 forbids the
prosecution for the crime charged in another trial, or one that is a
necessarily included offense, § 654 is broader insofar as it also in-
60 People v. Tideman, 57 Cal. 2d at 578, 370 P.2d at 1009, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 209.
61 Id. at 584-85, 370 P.2d at 1013-14, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 213-14.
19651
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW[
cludes those crimes that are part of an indivisible course of conduct.
But, under Tideman, the jeopardy provision of § 654 is only avail-
able after there has been a conviction and sentence, or an acquittal."2
In other words, the use of the double jeopardy provision of § 654 is
expressly confined to subsequent prosecution for the same act or
omission, where in the first trial there was (1) acquittal or (2) a
conviction and sentence.
V. CONCLUSION
In perspective, what the Supreme Court of California has done
through the Marshall and Neal cases has been to decrease the power
of government to continually harass a defendant through multi-
prosecutions for basically one crime. First, by holding that double
jeopardy will result where the facts of the first indictment could
have supported a conviction of a crime charged in a second indict-
ment, the Court has obviously broadened the right of the individual
not to be subject to multiple prosecutions. Second, in holding a
course of conduct prompted by one dominant intent to be only pun-
ishable once, the court has broadened the individual's right to be
free from multiple punishment.
The broadened base of these individual liberties, although desir-
able from the point of view of justice in the individual case, has
added new and confusing burdens to the already overworked Cali-
fornia courts. It is hoped that this article might serve to clarify this
confusing area.
Michael J. Bruce
62 People v. Seitarle, 59 Cal. 2d 703, 138 P.2d 947, 31 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1963).
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